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Résumé : Cette communication se concentre sur le 
cas du comité de normalisation de comptabilité de 
la Chine (CASC), qui a agi en 2006 de permettre 
l'utilisation de la méthode de mise en commun des 
intérêts pour les fusions dans certaines 
circonstances. Pourtant, cette méthode a été 
explicitement interdite par le FASB et l'IASB. On 
discute dans cet article deux questions principales. 
La première concerne le contexte culturel et 
économique du développement économique 
chinois, ce qui a mené les régulateurs chinois à 
adopter une approche aux regroupements qui 
diffère de la norme d'IASB. La deuxième traite du 
rôle joué par la compréhension de la réalité 
économique qui sous-tende les regroupements. La 
complexité de la réorganisation industrielle qui 
trouve actuellement en Chine mène à la réalisation 
que quelques regroupements sont des fusions et pas 
des acquisitions. C'est une observation significative 
qui soit digne d'une plus grande discussion et 
considération par les régulateurs des normes 
comptables internationales. 
  
Mot clés : IASB, regroupement, méthode 
d'acquisition, méthode de mise en commun, fusion 
 
 
 
Abstract: This article focuses on the case of the 
China Accounting Standards Committee (CASC), 
which acted in 2006 to require the use of the 
“pooling of interests method” under certain 
circumstances when accounting for business 
combinations. In contrast, the pooling of interests 
method has been explicitly prohibited by the US 
Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) and 
the IASB. The paper discusses two principal issues. 
The first concerns the cultural and economic 
context of Chinese economic development which 
led the Chinese standards setters to adopt an 
approach to accounting for business combinations 
which differs from the IASB standard. The second 
deals with the role played by the understanding of 
the underlying economics of business 
combinations, which leads in turn to different 
representations of the combination process. The 
complexity of accounting for the industrial 
reorganization that is currently taking place in 
China has led to the realization that some business 
combinations are mergers and not acquisitions. 
This is a significant observation and one which is 
worthy of greater discussion and consideration by 
accounting standards setting bodies.    
 
Key words: IASB, business combinations, 
purchase method, pooling of interest method, 
merger  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper we focus on the China Accounting Standards Committee’s (CASC) decision, in 
2006, to require the use of the “pooling of interests method” of accounting for business 
combinations under certain circumstances. The paper discusses two distinctive issues 
regarding the decision of the Chinese accounting standards setters. The first issue concerns 
the cultural and economic specificity of the accounting standards setting process.  The second 
issue concerns the role played by differential understandings of the economics underlying 
standards setting.  Our central argument is that the technical distinctions between accounting 
standards issued by different standards setting bodies may be based on different 
understandings of the underlying economics of transactions, thus leading to different 
representations of the same economic event. The representations produced by financial 
reports are derived from a specific context which shapes the regulatory structure. The 
regulatory structure is then affirmed and supported by standards setters operating within a 
particular regulatory regime, and is expected to have significant impacts on behaviors of 
shareholders, management, and auditors (Zhang & Huang 2008). The decision taken by the 
Chinese standards setters to require the pooling of interests method under certain 
circumstances provides an empirical example of the tension that exists between accounting’s 
role in serving the needs of global capital markets and its role in facilitating national 
economic policy. This tension is exemplified by the fair value approach which is primarily 
intended to serve the needs of global capital markets, while the historical cost approach 
focuses on operating performance and production which are crucial to national economic 
development.  
 
The Chinese approach to accounting for business combinations has been directed towards 
fostering the development of enduring business enterprises which are capable of participating 
in a global economy. Such firms provide the economic production, employment, and foreign 
currency revenues that facilitate economic development. Furthermore, these firms enter the 
international arena by exploiting certain competitive advantages which may be transitory. 
Thus, entering the international arena is a matter of increased production levels and industrial 
core competencies rather than maximizing share market values. The Chinese approach 
emphasizes production and employment, and in this context, accounting regulation becomes 
primarily concerned with development rather than serving the needs of capital market 
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participants. This orientation differs from the market facilitating agenda of the international 
accounting standards setting bodies which place the needs of capital markets at the core of 
everything. 
 
Interestingly, there has been some resistance to the implementation of international 
accounting standards in certain countries, thereby leading to a divergence (Ding et al., 2005).  
For example, the French accounting standards setters rejected the non-amortization of 
acquisition goodwill in two decisions (No. 2005-9 and 2005-10), issued in November 20051. 
The Japanese accounting standards setters manifested their dissent to IFRS 3 (Business 
Combinations) in several comment letters issued in 2001, 2003, and 2005. The Japanese 
standards setters also permit the pooling of interest method to be used in their national 
standards, and they require amortization of acquisition goodwill.  The Chinese, Japanese and 
Korean standards setters have joined together in an initiative which will permit the continued 
use of pooling under certain circumstances (CASC 2006).   
 
In this paper we argue that the actions of the national accounting standards setters which 
permit or require the pooling of interests method may be based on a different understanding 
of the underlying economics of business combinations as compared to that of the IASB.  In 
particular, the Chinese standards setters require business combinations between entities under 
common control to be accounted for using the pooling of interests method. Business 
combinations of this type are commonplace within the context of industrial reorganization 
currently taking place in China (Xu and Uddin, 2008).  However, business combinations 
under common control have been specifically excluded from the scope of the IASB’s 
standard on business combinations (IFRS 3). The IASB has recently initiated a project 
dealing with accounting for business combinations among parties under common control. In 
the revised version of IFRS3 issued in January 2008 the IASB concluded that “the pooling of 
interests method provide information superior to that provided by the purchase method, and 
that if true mergers were to be accounted for using a method other than the purchase method, 
the ‘fresh start’ method was likely to be more appropriate than the pooling of interests 
method” (BC48, d). 
 
                                               
1
 These decisions are primarily applicable to single companies and not listed groups. 
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At this point, therefore, international convergence of accounting standards has been 
confronted with divergence rather than convergence.  We argue that the Chinese standards 
setters have adopted a more transparent approach to accounting for business combination 
which recognizes that some combinations are mergers and not acquisitions. We believe that 
this acknowledgement is worthy of recognition by international accounting standards setting 
bodies (Baker, Biondi, and Zhang 2008).   
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  The first section discusses the cultural 
and economic context of accounting standards setting in China and provides an empirical 
example of a business combination under common control.  The second section compares the 
theoretical basis underlying the IASB and CASC pronouncements dealing with business 
combinations. The third section discusses the arguments in favor of and against the pooling 
of interests method. The final section summarizes the main arguments of the paper in relation 
to the ongoing process of global accounting standards setting and accounting regulation. 
 
2.  ACCOUNTING FOR BUSINESS COMBINATIONS IN CHINA 
 
2.1 Industrial reorganization in China 
The rapid rate of economic development in China has prompted significant changes in 
accounting regulation (see Biondi and Zhang, 2007 for further details). These changes have 
been affected by: (i) reorganizations among state enterprises, (ii) expansion of private 
business activities, and (iii) a more welcoming attitude towards foreign investment and 
international business relationships (Xu and Uddin, 2008).  Increasing economic development 
has also led to greater exposure by Chinese enterprises to foreign accounting practices and it 
has created a need for new accounting methods to account for modes of economic activity not 
previously encountered under state control (Suzuki et al. 2007). Among the issues addressed 
by the recent changes in accounting regulation are: accounting for consolidated entities, 
equity accounting, accounting for paid-in capital, fixed asset and depreciation accounting, 
intangible assets and goodwill, taxes and profit allocations. The case of business 
combinations is among these issues. 
 
As was the case for many European countries before the adoption of IASB standards, the 
institutional structure of accounting regulation in China was primarily based on the legal and 
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political system. Accounting standards are established by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
pursuant to legislation adopted by the National People’s Congress (Ezzamel et al. 2007). The 
China Accounting Standard Committee (CASC) was created to facilitate the standards setting 
process (Ernst & Young, 2006). Accounting regulation in China has been marked by two 
significant events. The first was the promulgation of a framework for accounting standards 
setting developed between 1988 and 1992 and summarized by the MOF in November 1992 
under the title, “Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises” (Blake and Gao, 1995). The 
second was a set of revised accounting standards issued in February 2006 (Ezzamel et al., 
2007).  
 
As a prelude to the 2006 revised standards, in November 2005, the CASC and the IASB held 
a meeting in Beijing where a joint statement was issued by the Secretary-General of the 
CASC, Mr Wang Jun, and the Chairman of the IASB, Sir David Tweedie.  This joint 
statement emphasized the specific needs of the Chinese context while nevertheless working 
towards convergence with IASB standards (IASB, 2005). The Chinese standard setters did 
not recognize the IASB as the Chinese accounting regulator. The direct application of IFRS 
by Chinese firms is explicitly forbidden (Deloitte IAS PLUS, 2008), as it is in Japan and 
Korea. Instead, the Chinese MOF established its own standards through a process of 
integrating and amending IASB standards. As a result, the institutional independence of the 
CASC was maintained. The Chinese authorities were particularly concerned about the impact 
of fair value accounting, as well as issues such as corporate governance, social responsibility, 
financial crises, and disruptions caused by globalisation (Biondi and Zhang, 2007; Xu and 
Uddin, 2008). 
 
2.2 The Chinese standard on accounting for business combinations  
CASC 20 was one of the standards included in the accounting reform of 2006 (see Ernst & 
Young 2006 for an English summary). CASC 20 standard sets forth the allowable methods of 
accounting for business combinations. It defines a business combination as “the bringing 
together of separate entities into one reporting entity”. Two methods are permitted depending 
on the degree of common control: 
• For business combinations involving entities under common control, the pooling of 
interests method must be applied; 
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• For business combinations involving entities not under common control, the purchase 
method must be applied. 
 
In the first case, a business combination is recorded using the book values of the combining 
companies and no goodwill is recognized. In the second case, the business combination is 
accounted for based on the fair values of the net assets acquired, and goodwill is recognized, 
subject to impairment tests, but goodwill is not amortized.  
 
The Accounting Department of the Chinese Ministry of Finance (AD MOF 2007, p. 292-293) 
provides the following definition of a business combination under common control: “The 
combining enterprises are ultimately controlled by the same party or parties before and after 
the combination, and control is not transitory”.   Some interpretive guidance was provided 
with this definition: 
1. The party which can carry out the ultimate control over the combining enterprises 
before and after the combination is usually the mother company of an enterprise 
group; 
2. The parties which can carry out the ultimate control over the combining enterprises 
before and after the combination are usually two, or more than two, legal persons or 
other organizations which demonstrate the same viewpoint or position when voting on 
the invested entities' productive and operational activities. In effecting the 
combination, these legal persons may intend to enlarge their voting shares in the 
invested enterprises, or strengthen the control status of certain investors over the 
invested enterprises, according to an existing agreement among investors; 
3. The combining enterprises were controlled by the ultimate controller for more than 
one year before the date of combination, and the reporting entity after the combination 
will be controlled by the same ultimate controller for more than one year. 
 
Thus, pursuant to the Chinese standard, business combinations are considered to be 
reorganizations among economic entities, rather than capital market transactions. The 
Chinese understanding of a business combination is therefore quite different from the 
understanding of business combinations contained in IASB standards. The Chinese 
understanding is relevant to the Chinese context, because many Chinese corporations are not 
listed in capital markets, and, even in the case of listed corporations, a large portion of their 
shares is not circulating or negotiable (Ding et al. 2005; Suzuki et al 2007).  In 2007, of the 
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total shares issued by Chinese firms, the negotiable part accounted for 38.1%, on average 
(based on CSRC monthly report, http://www.csrc.gov.cn/).   In addition, the Chinese 
approach to business combinations may be explained in part by an extensive amount of 
reorganization among state controlled enterprises, and other combinations under common 
control.  
 
2.3 The reorganization of the TCL Group 
State-owned enterprises in China are often controlled by a governmental agency (xingzheng 
zhuguan bumen), colloquially known as the ‘mother company’ (mu gongsi).  “Each state-
owned entity typically owes a subsidiary’s duty of loyalty to a number of administrative 
units” (Ruskola 2000).  The mother company may list its most profitable subsidiaries on the 
stock exchange, while continuing to be the controlling shareholder. Other less profitable 
subsidiaries may continue to be fully owned by the mother company. In 2004, state-owned or 
state-controlled enterprises accounted for 42.4% of the value-added by industry and 35.2% of 
the gross industrial output, while the private sector accounted for only 15.1% and 16.5%, 
respectively.  Foreign owned enterprises (including those from Hong Kong, Macao and 
Taiwan) accounted for 27.8 and 31.4%.3   
 
In 2003, TCL Group (“Parent”) and TCL Communication Equipment Co. (“Subsidiary”) 
entered into an agreement whereby the state-owned Parent merged with its publicly traded 
Subsidiary. The Subsidiary was the first component of TCL Group to be listed on Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange in 1993.  Huizhou Investments, a government owned, limited-liability 
company, located in the city of Huizhou, Guangdong Province (southern China), was the 
majority shareholder of TCL Group.  Huizou Investments was in turn controlled by the city 
of Huizhou, where TCL group is headquartered.  Huizhou Investments is a government 
agency created to foster economic development in Guandong province.  In 2003, TCL Group 
owned 106,656,000 non-circulating shares of TCL Communication Equipment Co., which 
represented 56.7% of the shareholders’ equity of the Subsidiary. The other shares were traded 
on the Shenzen stock exchange. On 30 September 2003, TCL Group (the Parent) announced 
that it was going to combine with its Subsidiary through an exchange of shares. After the 
combination, the joint entity was listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The 81,452,800 
circulating shares of the Subsidiary were exchanged for 404,395,944 shares of the Parent at 
an exchange price of 21.15 RMB, an exchange ratio of 4.965. The combination was 
completed on 7 January 2004 and the TCL Group was listed on 30 January 2004.   
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The pooling of interests method was used to account for the TCL Group reorganization. The 
press release issued to describe the transaction included the following reasons why the 
pooling of interests method was used.  Firstly, all or most of the shares of the combining 
entities were exchanged. Second, the shareholders of the combining entities became the 
shareholders of the combined entity. Third, the shareholders of the combining entities 
collectively assumed all of the risks of the combined entity. Fourth, there were no resources 
flowing from the combining entities to other parties. Fifth, according to the projected 
exchange ratio, the equity owned by the controlling party (Huizhou Investments) did not 
change before and after the combination. For these reasons, the combination was better 
represented by the pooling of interests method. 
In the annual report for 2003 (see Table 2), the consolidated net income of TCL Group was 
reported to be 570.57 million RMB, which included 145.18 million RMB of the net income of 
TCL Communication Equipment Co. (the Subsidiary) from January to June2. The 
shareholders’ equity was 2,263.38 million RMB, so the return on equity (ROE) was 25.21% 
(see Table 2).  If TCL Group had applied the purchase method, the performance ratios would 
have been reduced. At the date of the combination, the book value per share of TCL 
Communication Equipment Co. was 3.07 RMB, while the exchange price was 21.15 RMB. 
Thus, the ‘computed goodwill’3 would have been 1,473 million RMB based on combining 
only the circulating shares without recognizing any control premium. This goodwill would 
have added 1,473 million RMB to the shareholders’ equity. If the purchase method had been 
used, the net income of the Subsidiary before the combination date would not be recognized 
in the consolidated income statement, and the goodwill produced by the combination would 
not be amortized.  As a result, the net income of TCL Group would be reduced by 145.18 
million RMB, from 570.57 million RMB to 425.39 million RMB, while the shareholders’ 
equity would be increased from 2,263.38 million RMB to 3,736.38 million RMB. Therefore, 
the return on equity (ROE) would be reduced from 25.21% to 11.39%.4 
                                               
2
 The record date for recognition of the business combination was 30 June 2003, even though the combination 
was effected several months later.  
3
 The calculation of the ‘computed goodwill’ is as follows: (21.15-3.07) × 81452800 = 1,472.67 million RMB. 
Because of the limited disclosure of data, the fair values of TCL Communication Equipment Co. cannot be 
utilized; this is why the ‘computed goodwill’ is used here instead of the actual goodwill. 
4
 The above calculation of the ‘computed goodwill’ takes into account only the circulating part of the shares.  If 
the TCL Group (the parent) did not hold the original 56.7% shares of TCL Communication Equipment Co (the 
Subsidiary), and if all the shares of TCL Communication Equipment Co. were combined at the same exchange 
ratio, the ‘computed goodwill’ would be of 3,401 million RMB. In that case, the net income of TCL Group in 
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*** Insert Table 1 here *** 
 
If the purchase method had been applied to the TCL Group there would have been a 
significant negative impact on the consolidated financial statements of the Group.  The 
managers may not have proceeded with the combination, notwithstanding the important 
industrial and productive reasons for undertaking the combination. In addition, the negative 
effects on the performance ratios might have modified the initial public offering price of TCL 
Group shares, and this could affect the share price.  Finally, the solvency ratio would have 
changed significantly (from 4.51 to 2.73) as a result of an increase in shareholders’ equity, 
even though the liabilities of the Group would not change.  Pursuant to the pooling of interest 
method, goodwill was not recognized; therefore, all these performance ratios did not deviate 
substantially from those of prior years, thereby more properly representing the underlying 
economics of the business combination. 
 
In summary, the underlying economics of business combinations in China involve a transfer 
of assets “from one pocket to another pocket” (Pan 2002).  The terms and conditions of 
business combinations are determined by the controlling parties, and ownership control is not 
actually transferred. The underlying economics of this type of business combination are more 
properly represented by the pooling of interest approach. Huang et al. (2004) also point out 
that many Chinese business combinations occur among related entities. In this context, the 
use of the pooling of interests method is not only sound from an accounting standpoint, it also 
reduces transaction costs. Thus, in a setting where the capital markets are less than perfect 
and “fair values” are not reliable, the pooling of interests method is the most appropriate 
method of accounting for business combinations. 
 
3.  THEORETICAL DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
 
The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) was created in 2001 for the purpose of 
achieving convergence of financial accounting standards on a worldwide basis. The 
pronouncements of the IASB have been introducing a new accounting framework based 
largely on fair value basis of accounting, which in many respects is radically different from 
                                                                                                                                                  
2003 would be still 425.39 million RMB, but the equity would be raised from 2,263.38 million RMB to 
5,664.38 million RMB; thus, the return on net assets would be reduced from 25.21% to 7.51%. 
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the historical cost approach derived from normative accounting theory.  In the case of 
accounting for business combinations, the IASB has taken the position that virtually all 
business combinations are acquisitions (IFRS3, BC48, c) and that the purchase price of an 
acquired company represents the best measure of the fair value of the assets and liabilities of 
the acquired company, including acquisition goodwill (IFRS3, 24, a). By issuing Statement 
No. 20, which rejected the idea that all business combinations are acquisitions, the CASC 
focused on the reorganization of combining economic entities.  Thus, there are significant 
theoretical differences between the approach taken by the IASB and the CASC.  
 
The TLC case has provided an empirical example of the different understandings of the 
underlying economics business combinations held by the IASB and the CASC. In order 
examine these different understandings more thoroughly, this section presents a comparative 
analysis of the provisions of IFRS 3 and CASC 20.  The key provisions of the two 
pronouncements are summarized in Table 3.  The table is divided into the following 
categories: (i) definition of a business combination; (ii) exclusions from the scope of the 
standard; (iii) key concept for application; (iv) treatment for acquisition goodwill; (v) 
valuation of identifiable assets, liabilities and contingent liabilities; and (vi) the accounting 
method of reference. 
 
***Insert Table 2*** 
 
The IASB views a business combination as an acquisition in which the consideration 
exchanged is based on arm’s length bargaining between unrelated parties. This leads to any 
purchase premium (i.e. goodwill) being treated as a permanent intangible asset that is 
recognized and not amortized but periodically tested for impairment.  While the CASC 
recognizes the possibility of this type of business combination and allows for the acquisition 
method to account for such combinations, the CASC also recognizes the existence of another 
type of business combination (i.e. merger) in which there is not an arm’s length bargaining 
between unrelated parties.  In this case, there should be no revaluation of assets and liabilities 
and no recognition of goodwill. 
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Following the FASB approach, the IASB essentially based IFRS 3 on the concept of a change 
of control.  IFRS 3 (11, 39 and Appendix A) defines control as “the power to govern the 
financial and operating policies of an entity so as to obtain benefits from its activities”.  The 
IASB alluded to the possible existence of other types of business combinations, such as those 
where there is no change of control, or a combination between a parent and subsidiary, or 
combinations among entities under common control.  However, these types of business 
combinations were excluded from the scope of IFRS 3. The difficulty with mandating a 
single method of accounting in a global context is that the prescribed method may not 
encompass all possible transactions. It is reasonably clear that acquisition accounting should 
be used for virtually all transactions defined as a “business combination”, whilst pooling 
accounting method is definitely excluded from accounting for them.  
 
Pursuant to the revision of IFRS 3 issued in January 2008, the acquiring company is 
permitted to measure any noncontrolling interest in the acquiree either at fair value or at the 
proportionate share of the acquiree’s identifiable net assets (paragraph 19).  This permission 
to measure any noncontrolling interest at the proportionate share of the acquiree’s net assets 
approximates the pooling of interest method in a less informative way. Thus, the pooling of 
interests method, which was eliminated by previous standards, appears to have been re-
introduced in somewhat altered form (Baker, Biondi and Zhang 2008). This back-door 
reintroduction of pooling reinforces the asymmetry between acquisitions where there is a 
change of control, and other acquisitions where there is no change of control.  
 
The IASB reached the conclusion that all business combinations are acquisitions where 
control of one of the combining entities changes hands.  However, it is often difficult to 
determine whether a change of control has taken place. A number of business practices exist 
which permit a change of control without achieving ownership. Furthermore, “a business 
combination may be structured in a variety of ways for legal, taxation or other reasons” 
(IFRS 3, §5), even apart from an acquisition of ownership control.  Consequently, making a 
distinction between accounting methods based on a criterion of a change in ownership control 
may be contradicted by actual business practices.  .  
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The IASB understanding of the underlying economics of business combinations was based on 
acquisition model that envisions a capital market transaction among unrelated parties at a fair 
market price. The Chinese standards setters have suggested an alternative approach based on 
the notion of “common control” instead of a “change of ownership control”. Pursuant to the 
Chinese perspective, the underlying economics of many business combinations reflects a 
continuity of business interests and activities. This continuity of business activities may 
involve a change in strategies, organizational structures, shareholding interests, or 
management, but its primary purpose is the enhancement of the ongoing activities of the 
combining entities. Many business combinations - in China and elsewhere - are 
reorganizations among related entities, rather than capital market transactions. According to 
Jackson and Miyajima (2007), in 1991-2005, only a small minority of the business 
combinations in leading economies concerned publicly listed target companies (7,8% in 
Germany, 14,9% in USA, 9,5% in UK, 23,3% in Japan, 14,4% in France), and this proportion 
was decreasing, whilst one half were private companies (including in the USA and UK) and 
one third were subsidiaries (including in USA and UK). According to these statistics, based 
on the Thomson Deals database, at least one third of the combinations are intra-group 
reorganizations, whilst one half occurs in a private setting where the representational focus on 
an (efficient) capital market transaction scarcely applies. Drawing upon this preliminary 
evidence, “common control” may in fact be the main feature of business combinations rather 
than the exception, because continuity in the underlying financial and operating activities is 
expected to occur. Control is therefore a matter of continued “coordination” rather than a 
change of “ownership control”.   
 
By issuing Statement No. 20, the CASC did not focus on the representation of a business 
combination as an acquisition taking place in a capital market transaction.  Rather the focus 
was on the reorganization of economic activities. This perspective is consistent with the 
entity theory of accounting. While the IASB began with the entity theory, it quickly moved to 
an acquirer’s perspective (i.e. proprietorship theory), which views a business combination as 
a takeover of a target company by an acquiring company through an acquisition of ownership 
control5. A proprietorship perspective reflects the viewpoint of the shareholders of the 
acquiring company who want to have information about the values of the accounting 
                                               
5
 According to the revised release of IFRS3, including a not fair value measurement at least in some cases, the 
IASB’s position on the matter is perhaps more prudent, but it is not yet fully disclosed and applicable, so any 
conclusion is provisional.  
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elements of the disbanded target entity, including previously unrecognized goodwill.  
However, for this information to be relevant and reliable, the fair values of the net assets of 
the target company, as well as the total consideration paid, must be “fair,” i.e., the whole 
process must take place in complete and efficient markets. This is not the case if the parties to 
the combination are related or are under common control.   
 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the shareholders of the acquiring entity do not actually 
acquire the assets or the shares of the target company. The underlying economics of a 
business combination do not involve an “acquisition” but rather a “combining” of previously 
separate entities. A business combination is therefore a matter of operational continuity rather 
than a change of ownership control. Operational control involves a coordination of operations 
and activities among ongoing entities. If the combining entities are related to each other, and 
they share their business activities in some way, then the pooling of interests approach may 
be more appropriate. Consequently, the CASC took a distinctly different view of the 
underlying economics of business combinations, one which was based on an entity 
perspective of the ongoing operations of the combining entities.  
 
In an economic system characterized by competing business entities, a business combination 
may be best understood as reorganization between entities whose “governing” parties want to 
combine their activities in order to pursue them in an enhanced way.  This image does not 
correspond with the acquisition method. Many business combinations occur in a relational 
economic context among business entities, and those combinations do not reflect an arm’s 
length bargaining in a competitive marketplace. When combinations occur among related 
entities, the posted prices do not reflect the underlying economics of the combination process.  
In such cases the use of the acquisition method leads to recognition of internally generated 
goodwill and the capitalization of uncertain future benefits, as well as a failure to match the 
amortization of recorded goodwill against future revenues. According to Busse von Colbe 
(2004, p. 212), the recognition of the discounted present value of uncertain future benefits 
may lead to unrealized profits being distributed as dividends. In addition, this recognition can 
lead to a confused tax basis. In a combination among related economic entities, it is highly 
unlikely that the recognized goodwill or the “fair value” of the net assets of the combined 
entity will fairly represent the values implied by the underlying economics. If the pooling of 
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interests method were used instead, the net assets of the combining entities would be 
accounted for using book values, and the problem of unfair “fair values” would be avoided.  
 
4.  DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
The arguments advanced by the IASB in favor of the acquisition method are questionable 
when considered in light of the Chinese pronouncement on accounting for business 
combinations. Effectively, the IASB ignored the existence of mergers and focused instead on 
acquisitions, even though both mergers and acquisitions exist in empirical economic settings.  
Respondents to the IASB exposure drafts argued that mergers should be accounted for 
differently from acquisitions6. According to Ramanna (2007, p. 49), a majority of firms 
commenting on FASB 141 were in favour or maintaining the pooling of interests method. As 
well as paragraph B41 of FASB 141, paragraph BC34 of IFRS3r even noted that when 
undertaking a business combination, shares could be issued for cash and then the cash could 
be used to effect the combination, with the end result being the same as if shares had been 
used to effect the combination. However, when cash is used, the acquirer’s shareholders 
provide the cash, and the shareholders of the target company are liquidated. When a 
combination is effected through an exchange of shares, the acquiring company’s shareholders 
do not provide cash; rather, the shareholders of the target become the shareholders of the 
combined entity. Consequently, the two types of transactions are not the same, either in their 
underlying economics or their results.   
 
With respect to the discontinuity that is assumed to take place in the acquisition method, there 
often is frequently a continuity of interests in a merger.  All business combinations entail 
some bringing together of commercial strategies.  This observation is at odds with the 
assumed discontinuity of the acquisition method.  Furthermore, the prohibition of the pooling 
of interest or merger method may not be sound in an empirical sense because it is clearly 
possible to identify business combinations that are not acquisitions. If the existence of 
different kinds of business combinations is possible, the reliance on a single method is not 
justifiable. When certain economic features of a transaction distinguish them from other 
transactions, then it is appropriate to account them in different ways. If the existence of 
different types of business combinations is nowadays conceded by all the participants in the 
                                               
6
 See for example, the minority dissenting opinions of Geoffrey Whittington and Tatsumi Yamada to IFRS 3 
(IFRS 3, DO1-DO16).   
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accounting arena, accounting regulation, especially if based on principles, may easily accept 
to leave preparers choose, and concentrate then on careful guidance that shall avoid 
opportunistic switch among methods through time. Furthermore, a choice among methods is 
preferable if the intentions of management with respect to the underlying transactions are 
different. By choosing among alternatives, managers present signals to investors and analysts, 
thus providing qualitative information about strategies and policies adopted.  
 
Last but not least, the provision of information about intangibles that is assumed with the 
acquisition method may be questionable.  When a business combination is effected through 
an exchange of equity interests, or without any transfer of consideration, it is questionable 
whether anything of economic substance has occurred. Moreover, according to some 
empirical studies, the lack of recognition of acquisition goodwill does not impact value 
relevance in capital markets. Hopkins et al. (2000) present evidence suggesting that analysts 
assign a lower post-acquisition value to a purchase combination in which the parent company 
records and amortizes an acquisition premium (i.e. goodwill), compared with either a 
purchase combination in which the parent expenses the entire premium as in-process research 
and development, or a pooling-of-interest combination. Their findings looked at analysts’ 
share-price judgments regarding combinations occurring three years in the past as compared 
to one year in the past. The pooling approach may therefore be preferred, even by capital 
markets.7 Furthermore, Mintchik (2006) has attempted to disentangle the impact on earnings 
forecast errors by eliminating pooling from accounting for goodwill and other disclosures. 
She provides evidence that the existence of pooling does not create additional problems for 
accurate forecasting and that the improved disclosure is beneficial. 
 
In sum, the rationale for eliminating the pooling of interests method is questionable. The 
primary argument in favor of the acquisition method is that virtually all business 
combinations are acquisitions. This ignores the existence of mergers, which are not 
acquisitions, but rather, reorganizations of economic activities. Business combinations are 
complex and significant events which need to be accounted for carefully. This complexity 
                                               
7
 Pursuant to efficient market theory, market prices are the best representation of value, and accounting must 
follow them. However, the accounting information received by the capital markets is based on the earnings of 
the firm mainly generated through time and hazard (Biondi, 2005). This information plays an important role by 
providing a common knowledge base available for subjective valuation and decision-making (Sunder, 2001). 
This is a particular type of information that complements and does not follow the information provided by the 
price system (Biondi, 2003; Biondi and Rebérioux, 2008). 
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should lead to the search for the distinctive features of business combinations which 
discriminate between different types of transactions under conventional or featuring bases. 
 
The elimination of pooling appears to have been motivated by a different and perhaps limited 
understanding of this method. The typical view has been to consider pooling from the 
proprietorship perspective, viewing the combination as an exchange transaction between the 
owners of the combining entities. This accounting representation has merit when the 
combination is effected solely through an exchange of ownership interests, and it may be 
understood to be a mere change in legal form. But, when a significant change in ownership 
interests is involved, something of economic substance has occurred, especially when the 
entity is required to expense the issuance of the shares distributed to effect the combination, 
and a significant premium is paid in the exchange ratio. In order to recognize this economic 
event, the acquisition method was defined to be the solution that allowed accounting for 
business combinations independently from the means utilized to effect the combination. This 
decision was motivated from a capital market perspective which conflates the consideration 
paid with a change in ownership control. However, from the Chinese viewpoint, which 
focuses on the merger of ongoing business entities, the main point is the distinction between 
shareholders’ equity and entity equity (Biondi, 2007). If we make a distinction between 
shareholders’ equity and entity equity, the “mere change in legal form” argument no longer 
holds, and continuity of operations becomes the cornerstone of the pooling approach. From 
this perspective, the non recognition of acquisition goodwill allows for the maximum 
consistency in accounting reports (and related measures of performance).  At the same time, 
this continuity of operations perspective may actually constitute a coherent basis for 
recognizing goodwill.8  The pooling method can distinguish entity equity from shareholder 
equity, and thus recognize the difference between the consideration paid and the net book 
value of the acquired firm as a variant of “acquisition goodwill” which does not require 
estimating fair values of specific assets. The acquiree’s shareholders are effectively receiving 
consideration in exchange for ratifying the merger, especially when the business combination 
takes place among entities not under common control. By making a distinction between 
shareholders’ equity and entity equity, the pooling approach can charge or credit the 
acquisition differential to entity equity. This would then account for the implicit financial 
                                               
8
 Many respondents agreed that, if goodwill is also capitalised, it should be amortised, to make management 
responsible of the investment of entity resources that might be utilised otherwise, or distributed to stakeholders. 
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resources management is using to effect the merger (instead of utilizing these resources 
otherwise, in reinvestments, dividends or donations). 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Accounting for a business combination using the acquisition method requires the 
identification of an acquiring entity, the identification of an acquired entity, and the 
measurement of an acquisition price. While this is seemingly a straight forward exercise, the 
satisfaction of these requirements underestimates the complexity associated with the 
synergistic transformation that takes place in a business combination. The measurement of 
the acquisition price requires an undue reliance on the consideration paid as the proper 
measure of value, and it forces an unreliable estimation of fair values as the basis for future 
accountability (Ramanna and Watts 2007).  The inclusion of minority interests in the overall 
equity continues the “change of ownership” concept adopted by the IASB and emphasizes the 
assumed existence of “diffuse ownership” in competitive capital markets (Holderness, 2008). 
As a result, it is practically impossible to distinguish fair value from book value. Moreover, 
transactions between shareholders and the acquiring company may be accounted for as equity 
transactions. This presents a problem that is similar to the one that stigmatized pooling in the 
first place: if the transaction has a cost for the entity (i.e., involves a payment to minority 
shareholders from entity resources), the payment is not recognized or accounted for.   
 
These difficulties raise significant questions about the acquisition method. The alleged 
congruence of the acquisition method with the historical cost principle (IFRS3r, BC41) is 
based on an analogy between a business combination and a purchase of a single asset. This 
analogy is driven by the image of a transfer of ownership control, where the right to exercise 
control is paid for in a lump sum, but from an accounting perspective, the net assets are 
actually combined on a piecemeal basis.  Consequently, the representation of the underlying 
economics of a business combination as reflected by the acquisition method is at odds with 
the idea of the firm as an economic entity and a going concern.  Continuity in the operations 
of the entity is a primary requisite for a going concern.  Continuity also becomes a useful 
criterion for distinguishing between a merger (continuity) and an acquisition (lack of 
continuity).  When a business combination takes place between entities under common 
control, continuity of operations is obvious because the enterprises are related components of 
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the same economic entity. When the combination occurs among economically independent 
entities, the continuity of the enterprises depends largely on management’s strategic 
intentions; nevertheless, continuity is often the desired strategic objective. 
 
The economic entity assumption and the going concern assumption are central concepts to 
accounting theory which have been adopted in virtually every country and regulatory context 
(Hoarau, 2006, p. 43).9  These assumptions provide the basis for historical cost accounting, 
but historical cost accounting does not purport to provide a current valuation for the firm; 
instead it reflects the income generating processes of the firm over time.  The acquisition 
method is therefore not consistent with historical cost accounting.  Moreover, when the 
complexities of the underlying economics of a business combination are accounted for using 
the acquistion method, the reported values are only estimates.  There is a disregard of the 
continuity in the activities of the combined enterprises. This casts doubt upon the relevance 
of fair values which are subjectively estimated, either for assessing managerial accountability 
or for purposes of share valuation. 
 
If some transaction are felt to be too complex to be properly accounted for, accounting 
regulation might just as well be reduced to providing general guidance and allow managers to 
make choices regarding specific accounting methods.  If opportunistic behaviors and 
misleading representations are feared to be the result of accounting flexibility, then it may be 
more prudent to allow only one method; but in that case it might well be that the pooling of 
interests method would be preferable in most cases. The elimination of the pooling method 
seems to have been based on a particular understanding of the underlying economics of 
business combinations.  The Chinese accounting standards setters ought to develop a 
distinctly different understanding of business combinations, one which reflects the possibility 
that there will be reorganizations among entities under common control and that these types 
of combinations should be accounted for using the pooling of interest method.  
                                               
9
  Cf. also FASB 141, paragraphs B53 et B54. 
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 TABLE 1 
Pro Forma Analysis of the Impact of  
Pooling versus Purchase for TCL Industries Reorganization 
(Million RMB) 
 Pooling Method  
(as reported) 
Purchase Method 
 (pro forma) 
Consolidated net income (a) 570.57 425.39 
Total Liabilities (b) 10,199.94 10,199.94 
Shareholders’ equity (c) 2,263.38 3,736.38 
Acquisition goodwill -- 1,473.00 
Return on Equity (a/c) 25.21% 11.39% 
Debt to Equity (b/c) 451% 273% 
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TABLE 2 
Comparison of IFRS 3 and CASC 20 
 
 
  
IFRS 3  
 
CASC 20 
(i) Definition of a 
business combination 
A business combination involves the 
bringing together of separate entities or 
businesses into one reporting entity. 
A business combination involves the 
bringing together of separate entities 
or businesses into one reporting entity. 
(ii) Scope exclusions 
♦ Joint ventures 
♦ Entities under common control 
♦ Mutual entities 
♦ Combinations by contract alone 
without obtaining ownership 
interest 
♦ Long-term equity investments 
(iii) Whose controls  Acquirer Controlling party or parties 
(iv) Treatment of 
goodwill  
Recognized as an asset, but not 
amortized. Tested for impairment. 
♦ Entities under common control: 
not recognized. 
♦ Entities not under common 
control: Recognized as asset, but 
not amortized. Tested for 
impairment. 
(v) Valuation of assets 
and liabilities Fair value 
♦ Entities under common control: 
Book value. 
♦ Entities not under common 
control: Fair value. 
(vi) Accounting 
method of reference Purchase 
♦ Entities under common control: 
Pooling. 
♦ Entities not under common 
control: Purchase 
